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The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating
Electoral Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics
HEATHER K. GERKEN
WHEN ACADEMICS AND POLICYMAKERS talkabout what ails American politics, many
offer a similar diagnosis: the problem is that 
we leave the regulation of politics to politics;
elected officials set the rules by which they are
elected. Unsurprisingly, the proposed cure to
this problem is often to create an independent
body to set the rules, insulating its members
from the distorting effects of special interest
politics.1 As Michael Kang writes of the prob-
lem that has most recently captured critics’ at-
tention—the fact that legislators draw their
own districts—there is an “understandable im-
pulse to retreat from the political process.”2
Proposals for independent districting commis-
sions abound in the scholarly literature and re-
form blueprints.3 Most of these proposals offer
a technocratic solution: a commission com-
posed of neutral experts.4 A handful5 are mod-
eled on the British Columbia Citizens’ Assem-
bly, composed of 160 randomly chosen citizens
who deliberated for several months and pro-
posed a new system for electing candidates in
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1 I term these bodies “electoral reform commissions.”
There are, of course, at least two types of functions that
such decision making bodies could serve: a legislative
function (proposing or setting the basic rules that govern
elections) and an administrative one (the day-to-day run-
ning of elections). This article focuses solely on the for-
mer and uses the term electoral reform commissions to make
clear that I am talking about institutions charged with rec-
ommending changes as to how our election system is run
rather than with implementing those requirements, once
enacted. For further description, see infra Section I.B. For
analysis of the use of independent agencies to administer
election laws once enacted, see Richard L. Hasen, Beyond
the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Electoral Adminis-
tration to Avoid Electoral Meltdowns, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
937 (2005).
2 Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy
and the Future of Redistricting, 84 Wash U.L.Q— (forth-
coming 2007). Kang’s paper is devoted to a question not
addressed here—how much public involvement should
there be in setting the background rules of politics—and
argues that we should use direct democracy to foster
greater public engagement in the process. For another,
quite different analysis of this question, see Dennis F.
Thompson, Who Should Govern Who Governs? The Role of
Citizens in Reforming the Electoral System (unpublished
draft, 2005).
3 Consider what has appeared in the Harvard Law Review
alone in the last few years. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerry-
mandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 641
(2002); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionaliza-
tion of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 78–83 (2005).
Reform groups, including heavy hitters like Common
Cause and the League of Women Voters, have similarly
endorsed independent districting commissions. http://
www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?cdkLNK1MQIw
G&b196481 (last visited Sept. 5, 2006); http://www.
campaignlegalcenter.org/redistricting-223.html (Report
at 41) (last visited Sept. 5, 2006).
the province for approval via referendum.6
This article addresses those who are attracted
to such institutions because they desire inde-
pendence7—a chance to shut self-interested leg-
islators, special interest groups, and political
parties out of the decision making process, or
at least to minimize their influence over the rel-
evant decision makers.
The modest point of this article is that inde-
pendence is a double-edged sword. I do not
seek here to quibble with the basic impulse be-
hind proposals for reform. Nor do I offer what
has by now become the conventional response
to calls for independence—the argument that
true political independence is impossible to
achieve. Instead, granting reformers’ claim that
independence can be had, I query whether one
can have too much of a good thing. Giving elec-
toral reform commissions too much indepen-
dence from politics may, ironically, undermine
the success of reform efforts in the long run. In-
dependence, in short, has costs as well as ben-
efits: it gives the decision maker credibility to
speak, but it creates the risk that the content of
the speech will never become a reality.
The solution to the problem of political in-
fection, then, is not to quarantine electoral re-
form commissions from everyday politics,8 but
to inoculate them. Inoculation, of course, re-
quires one to be infected by the very virus one
seeks to avoid. My proposal is thus to infuse
the decision making process with some of the
concerns that dominate everyday politics. In-
deed, while scholars and policymakers of all
stripes tend to express disdain for politics, I
wish to argue that reform efforts can fail be-
cause they do not involve enough politicking.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I de-
scribes the empirical justification for inoculat-
ing electoral reform commissions against poli-
tics. It begins by describing and defending the
key assumption underlying the article—that
most reform will involve an iterated process
that requires a proposal to win legislative or
popular approval in order to be implemented.
The dilemma for reformers, then, is that they
must play politics in order to change the way
politics ultimately will be played. This Part
then examines a small but burgeoning litera-
ture on the institutional structures that are most
likely to achieve reform in areas where law and
politics intersect. Although that literature is too
embryonic to draw firm conclusions, it sug-
gests that fully independent decision making
bodies can sometimes be less effective at achiev-
ing reform than institutions that are at least
partially enmeshed within the political system.
Independence, counterintuitively enough, can
sometimes insulate decision makers from po-
litical pressures to such an extent that they lose
sight of what type of reform is politically real-
istic. Moreover, political elites can play a cru-
cial role in ensuring that public support for re-
form runs wide as well as deep, and it is
politically connected reform commissions that
have a better chance of gaining the support of
such elites.
Part II offers a first cut at the more difficult
question raised by this article: how do we strike
the proper balance between political infection
and political quarantine? It argues that any in-
oculation strategy must be tailored to the type
of institution in question. Independent com-
missions dominated by technocratic elites may
be handicapped in systematically different
ways than citizens’ assemblies in devising and
helping pass sensible reform. Because any such
analysis depends heavily on context, this sec-
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4 Supra sources in note 3.
5 Infra text accompanying notes 14 to 16 (noting the states
and countries which have established or are considering
establishing a citizens’ assembly).
6 See http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public (last
visited Sept. 5, 2006); see also infra Section II.B.
7 As Chris Elmendorf has helpfully pointed out, the word
independence has many meanings: sometimes it refers to
formal, de jure structures protecting a decision making
body from politics (e.g., whether it can exercise power
unilaterally, whether its membership is beholden to other
political bodies, whether it is insulated from retaliation);
other times it conveys a de facto removal from politics. For
these purposes, I generally mean to use the word in its
colloquial sense, to refer to de facto distance or aloofness
from politics. In using the term in this way, however, I
do not mean to downplay the fact that these meanings
are often closely intertwined in practice. After all, a body
with formal rulemaking independence or protection from
political retaliation is more likely to be “independent” in
the colloquial sense than one that is institutionally be-
holden to political actors in some way. And the purpose
of this article is to examine formal and informal design
strategies that would encourage electoral reform com-
missions to pay adequate attention to political concerns.
8 I use the phrase politics here in its colloquial (and thus
negative) sense to refer to a political system marked by
partisanship and special interests.
tion of the article will not offer a full-blown ac-
count of every institutional mechanism one
might employ to inoculate a given electoral re-
form commission. Instead, it will use the recent
experience of the British Columbia Citizens’
Assembly as a case study in order to offer a
few, tentative suggestions about how to strike
the appropriate balance between political en-
gagement and political independence.
I. INDEPENDENCE AS 
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
A. The dominance of the independence model
It is not surprising that so many scholars and
policymakers are attracted to the independence
model in thinking about how to design elec-
toral reform commissions. For scholars at-
tracted to the deliberative model, indepen-
dence allows citizens to retreat from everyday
politics to think through the difficult problems
before them. Insulated from the pressures of
partisan politics and self-interested lobbying,
discussion can take place on the terms that
many deliberative democrats believe confer le-
gitimacy on the outcome.9 Even public choice
scholars—who pride themselves on taking a
more clear-eyed view of politics than their ide-
alistic academic brethren—tend to favor inde-
pendent decision making. While public choice
scholars always worry about the problem of
capture, independent commissions seem less
vulnerable to the influence of special interests
than legislatures. The case is even easier with
regard to electoral commissions, where those
most tainted by self-interest are the legislators
themselves.10
Policymakers also seem to favor the inde-
pendence model. U.S. reformers have repeat-
edly proposed independent commissions com-
posed of retired judges or technocrats for
drawing district lines, and not a year goes by
without some blue ribbon panel of experts sug-
gesting how we can improve our democracy.
Similarly, the decision by two Canadian
provinces and the Netherlands to create as-
semblies composed of average citizens to de-
liberate about reform seems to embody a de-
sire to avoid the distorting effects of special
interest groups, party politics, and legislative
self-interest and thus “align the interests of [de-
cision makers] with those of the citizens.”11
The benefits of independence are so obvious
that one would think that almost anyone could
agree as to its virtues. It offers all the attrac-
tions of intellectual purity: objectivity, the
chance to vindicate the public interest rather
than special interests, an opportunity to avoid
the unappetizing brew of watered-down re-
form. But notice that the easiest case to be made
for independence concerns its outputs; most are
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9 See Dennis F. Thompson, Just Elections 168–79 (2002)
(endorsing deliberative electoral reform commission); see
also Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale
L.J. 1539, 1549 (1988) (arguing that those who favor civic
republicanism—a historically influenced normative ac-
count in favor of deliberation favored by many law pro-
fessors—will “attempt to insulate political actors from
private pressure”); id. at 1560 (arguing that even elected
representatives should enjoy “substantial autonomy”);
Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary
Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 Yale L.J. 1651, 1653 (1988)
(on reviewing the civic republicanism literature, con-
cluding that its “most important structural goal appears
to be political insulation”). For a less sanguine view of the
role that political insulation plays in fostering healthy de-
liberation, see Amy Guttman and Dennis Thompson,
Democracy and Disagreement 45–47, 128–64 (1996).
10 The most recent and powerfully articulated variant of
this argument is made by Sam Issacharoff. See Issacharoff,
supra note 3. For a spirited response, see Nathaniel Persily,
In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judi-
cial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 649 (2002).
11 The phrase comes from an anonymous reviewer. In-
terestingly, even the participants in the BC Citizens’ As-
sembly seemed to value the Assembly’s insulation from
party politics. For instance, when members of one politi-
cal party, the Greens, tried to lobby the Assembly, the
strategy backfired, as members of the Assembly resented
the Greens’ effort to influence the decision making pro-
cess. See Glenn Bohn, Greens won’t endorse but like electoral
reform, Vancouver Sun, May 3, 2005, at A5 (according to
Green Party leader, “the citizens’ assembly wanted every
party neutral . . . they didn’t want political interference”);
R.S. Ratner, The B.C. Citizens’ Assembly: The Public Hear-
ing and Deliberations Stage, Canadian Parliamentary Re-
view 27 (Spring 2005) (noting that Assembly participants
expressed concerns about the “infiltration and dominance
of special interest groups into the hearings and submis-
sion processes”). According to one report, the Green
Party’s use of a common political tool—”bombard[ing]
the assembly with hundreds of identical submissions”—
ended up “provoking a backlash” from some members of
the Assembly. Vaughn Palmer, Vote on electoral reform not
necessarily the last word, James says, Vancouver Sun, April
6, 2005, at A3.
ready to trust the results of a decision making
process shielded from partisan politics.
B. The institutional terrain for reform
In thinking about how best to design elec-
toral reform commissions, however, we ought
to think not only about the quality of their out-
puts, but the likelihood that their recommen-
dations, once offered, will actually be put into
practice. Even if we can all agree that inde-
pendent decision makers will have good judg-
ment about what ought to be done, will they
actually get it done?
To evaluate that question, of course, we must
know what the institutional terrain looks like,
and this brings me to the underlying premise
of the article: reform proposals will at some
point have to be tested on the turf of everyday
politics. It would be simple, of course, if reform
commissions were like Athena and thus
sprang, fully formed, from the head of a god.
After all, if we hypothesize a commission that
is independent in every sense of the word—be-
holden to no one and able to rule unilaterally
in the area of electoral reform—concerns about
the commission’s ability to get things done
would fall away.
When we move from the ideal to the real
world, we discover that reform is usually an it-
erated process; reform commissions generally
must win legislative or popular approval for
their recommendations to be implemented.
That is obviously true of privately created blue
ribbon panels. But even if we look to state-cre-
ated reform commissions, they tend to be the
product of compromise and thus vested with
similarly limited powers.12 In the strong vari-
ant, such commissions are given formal agenda
setting power, with their proposals guaranteed
a vote. In the weaker variant, commissions are
vested with the authority to make recommen-
dations only. Examples of state-created com-
missions with powers limited in this fashion
abound. The oft-cited American example of a
nonpartisan districting commission, Iowa’s,
follows this model. This is how districting com-
missions and electoral reform commissions
function in Canada, Australia, and the United
Kingdom.13 And this is how the newest vari-
ant of the reform commission, the citizens’ as-
sembly, worked in British Columbia and will
work in Ontario,14 and perhaps other places,
such as the United Kingdom15 and California.16
Nor is it surprising that so many real-world
examples of state-created electoral commis-
sions function in this way. As a practical mat-
ter, electoral commissions must be put in place
by somebody, usually a legislative somebody.
In the unusual case where political pressures
become so great that politicians feel the need
to do something reform-minded, this type of de-
mocratic check on a nominally independent
commission’s power is likely to be a more at-
tractive option to legislators than ceding full
control to the commission.17 After all, although
an iterated process may grant agenda-setting
power to the commission, it nonetheless allows
legislators to reject reforms they cannot stom-
ach. Reform proposals must also withstand de-
mocratic scrutiny if one follows the model of
the B.C. Assembly, whose proposals would be-
come law only if approved via referendum.18
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12 In the words of one study, “electoral systems are rarely
designed; they are born kicking and screaming into the
world out of a messy, incremental compromise between
contending factions battling for survival, determined by
power politics.” Pippa Norris, Introduction: The Politics of
Reform, 16 Intl. Pol. Sci. Rev. 3, 4 (1995).
13 Christopher S Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement
Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80
NYU L. Rev. 1336, 1386–94 (2005). The Netherlands Citi-
zens’ Assembly will follow this model as well. http://
snider.blogs.com/citizensassembly/2006/03/update_fro
m_net.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
14 Ontario to appoint citizens assembly on election reform
(press release, FairVote Canada, Nov. 18, 2004).
15 Daniel Forman, “Call for citizens’ assembly on electoral
system,” ePolitix.com (Aug. 4, 2005).
16 Editorial, “Where politicians dare to tread,” San Fran-
cisco Chronicle (June 18, 2006).
17 In New Zealand, for instance, the government set up
an electoral reform commission “only because it was felt
to pose no threat,” since “its findings could always be
shunted, if necessary, to obscurity in a parliamentary
committee.” David Denemark, “Choosing MMP in New
Zealand: Explaining the 1993 Electoral Reform,” in Mixed-
Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? 70, 85
(eds. Shugart and Wahenberg, 2001).
18 Consistent with the assumption that even politicians
pressured into creating an electoral reform commission
will do what they can to undermine its chances of suc-
cess, it is worth noting that even the B.C. government,
which created the first citizens’ assembly, could not resist
imposing a fairly high bar on reform, requiring a 60%
province-wide vote as well as support across B.C.’s rid-
ings for the measure to pass. See infra text accompanying
One might think that there is an easy strat-
egy for creating a commission that can man-
date, rather than merely propose, reform: the
initiative process. If legislators are unwilling to
create a fully independent commission, re-
formers should simply take their case directly
to the people. Even there, however, political
elites can wield considerable influence. As-
sessing reform proposals, of course, is a diffi-
cult task, one that few voters have the time or
energy to do. They thus rely on cues in casting
their vote, and those cues are often provided
by the political parties and other democratic
elites. Not only can politicians mobilize popu-
lar support, they can affect voters’ decisions
merely by taking a public stand.
The problem, of course, is that the group best
able to provide political cues and mobilization
in support of reform—the party in power—will
almost always oppose reform. And if the ma-
jority party opposes reform, there is a good
chance that so too will the majority of citizens.19
Consider, for instance, what recently took place
in California and Ohio, where reformers tried to
create nonpartisan districting commissions via
referenda. Despite public support for redistrict-
ing reform, both referenda failed.20 The most
likely explanation is that voters were relying on
cues in deciding whether the proposals made
sense. Democrats, who are in the majority in Cal-
ifornia, apparently voted against Proposition 
77 because it was backed by Republican Gover-
nor Schwarzenegger. Similarly, Republicans in
GOP-dominated Ohio seem to have voted
against Issue 4 because it was backed by a group
composed of Democrats and unions.21
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note 63; Myke Logan, “We still want BC-STV—Reclaiming
Democracy,” Common Ground Canada (Sept. 2, 2005) (argu-
ing that the legislature’s departure from B.C.’s usual prac-
tice on referenda, implementing proposals that gain a sim-
ple majority of the vote, was a deliberate effort to scuttle
reform). Similarly, New Zealand’s National Party, which
staged the referenda that led to the country’s switch of its
election system, deliberately made the process complex (the
vote, for instance, was a multi-stage process) in a “not-so-
subtle maneuver” to “defeat reform.” Jack Nagel, What Po-
litical Scientists Can Learn from the 1993 Electoral Reform in
New Zealand, 27:3 P.S.: Pol. Sci. & Pols. 525, 526 (Sept. 1994).
Even if one, in theory, encountered a sufficient concen-
tration of reform-minded legislators willing to create a
body that looks fairly independent, the problem of capture
remains in the long term. Indeed, there is a cottage indus-
try in administrative law devoted to identifying the many
ways in which administrative independence can be un-
dermined by legislative self-interest. Much of this litera-
ture builds on the seminal work of the “McNollgast” trio
concerning the use of procedural rules and institutional de-
sign strategies to control agencies. See Mathew D. McCub-
bins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Polit-
ical Control, 3 J. L. Econ. & Org. 243 (1987); see also Murray
J. Horn and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Adminis-
trative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Ad-
ministrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Re-
sponse to Agency Costs, 75 Virg. L. Rev. 499 (1989); Jonathan
R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 8 J. L. Econ., & Org. 93 (1992); Barry
R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal
Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765 (1983). For a critical
and thoughtful response, see Steven P. Croley, Public-In-
terested Regulation, 28 Fl. St. L. Rev. 7 (2000). For efforts to
apply the insights of this literature to the debate over
agency independence, see Rachel E. Barkow, Administering
Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 730–35, 757, 799 (2005) (doc-
umenting the dangers of capture even for independent
agencies with lawmaking authority); Elmendorf, supra note
13, at 1379 (based on an analysis of all of the models in the
U.S., concluding capture as “a live possibility, if not an in-
evitability”).
19 There are exceptions to this rule, to be sure. In places
where anti-party sentiment runs particularly high, a ma-
jor party’s endorsement may do as much to undermine
an initiative proposal as to help it. See infra note 41.
20 See Caroline Tolbert et al., Mass Support for Redistricting
Reform: Partisanship and Representational Winners and Losers
(unpublished draft prepared for the APSA 2006 meeting)
(exploring this paradox).
21 Partisan heuristics are not the sole explanation for the
votes (consider the fact that a good number of Democrats
voted against the Ohio provisions). Nonetheless, partisan
cues were widely available. In Ohio, for instance, critics
of the initiative repeatedly branded it as a Democratic
power grab. See, e.g., Opinion, “Case Against Issue 4
Takes a Hit,” Dayton Daily News, Nov. 3, 2005, at A14
(“From the beginning of the debate about Issue 4, critics
have portrayed it as a Democratic effort to take power
from Republicans.”). Newspapers reinforced these types
of partisan cues. For instance, an editorial in the Cleveland
Plain Dealer claimed that “[i]t’s easy to see why Republi-
cans don’t want to see Ohio change the rules that govern
political fund-raising, legislative district mapping, elec-
tions supervision and political fund-raising. They hold all
of the high cards at the moment. . . . It’s just as easy to
see why the Democrats are dying to change the rules.
They’re so short of high cards, they’ve practically been
dealt out of the game.” Kevin O’Brien, “Reform Ohio
Now? No, no, and no,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 19,
2005, at B11; see also Martin Gottlieb, “Issue 4 is the One
that Counts,” Dayton Daily News, Oct. 16, 2005, at B8 (“Re-
publican leaders oppose the reform, Issue Four, because
they are benefiting from the current system”); Opinion,
“Black Leaders OK of Issue 4 Says a Lot,” Dayton Daily
News, Oct. 12, 2005, at A8 (“[t]he real concern of the op-
ponents of reform is that if the Republicans can’t draw
The California and Ohio examples confirm
how difficult it is to put an all-powerful elec-
toral reform commission into place via initia-
tive. These examples suggest that even when
the pressure for reform is sufficiently intense
to force a change in the status quo, the appar-
ently more palatable, middle-ground ap-
proach—an independent commission that can
propose but not unilaterally enact election re-
form—may be more likely to garner the sup-
port (or at least avoid the intense opposition)
of the legislative elites who can influence the
initiative vote.22
C. The costs of independence
For all of these reasons, whether we are
dealing with privately-created blue ribbon
panels or state-created commissions, politics
is the likely territory through which any re-
form proposal must pass.23 Needless to say,
everyday politics can be fairly rocky terrain
for those who favor reform. Political elites
have significant incentives to oppose change,
and voters rarely place electoral reform at the
top of the political agenda. The question,
then, is how best to design a commission to
navigate this political terrain. And there is a
small but burgeoning literature suggesting
that in this context, where advocates for
change face an uphill political battle, the pure
independence model may not always be the
best one.
Political insulation brings many advantages
in the reform process, of course. Independence
is a valuable coin in the realm of politics. Po-
litical actors of all sorts have discovered the
power associated with the perception of neu-
trality and independence—everyone, it seems,
wishes to be a political maverick. We can thus
imagine that citizens will give greater credence
to the product of an independent citizen’s as-
sembly or commission than they would to the
decision of elected representatives or the pro-
posals of special interest groups.
Nonetheless, the case for independence is
more complex than this conventional account
would suggest. Unless popular support for
change runs wide and deep, it is hard to push
reform through the democratic process. And
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the maps, there might be fewer Republicans elected”).
Similarly, in California, voters had the most obvious of
partisan cues, with California’s action-star-turned-gover-
nor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, supporting the initiative
and leading Democrats on the other side. See, e.g., Jim Puz-
zanghera, “Davis Opposes Reform Initiatives,” San Jose
Mercury News, Oct. 29, 2005 (quoting California’s former
governor, a Democrat, on the measure); Carla Marinucci,
“Dean Urges Voters to Reject Measures Governor Sup-
ports,” San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 17, 2005, at B1 (quot-
ing Democratic heavyweight Howard Dean). Newspa-
pers followed the politicians’ lead, linking the governor’s
proposal to Tom Delay, see, e.g., Jamie Court, “The Secret
Force Behind the Propositions,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 30,
2005, at M3, and noting that Republicans were providing
significant funding for the measure while many Democ-
rats were supporting the opposition forces. See, e.g., John
Wildermuth, “‘Nonpartisan’ Measure Draws Partisan De-
bate,” San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 27, 2005, at B2; Dan
Morain, “Shell Games Hide Source of Donations,” Los An-
geles Times, Oct. 23, 2005, at B1; Robert J. Caldwell, “Back
to the Booth,” San Diego Union-Tribune, Nov. 7, 2005, at
G1. Post-election assessments provide some confirmation
of the importance of partisan cues to the results of the ref-
erenda. See, e.g., Lake Research Partners, Redistricting in
CA and OH (JEHT Foundation 2006), available at
http://electionupdates.caltech.edu/2006/02/why-
did-redistricting-reform-fail-in.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2006) (documenting dramatic partisan split in refer-
enda votes in two states); Tolbert et al., supra note 20 (find-
ing that voters’ partisan interests influenced the vote in
each state but raising questions about elite influence).
22 Ohio and California’s initiative votes, of course, did not
involve particular reform proposals but the creation of in-
dependent districting commissions, a close analog to the
type of electoral commission discussed in this article.
Those referenda thus raise the question—not answered
here—as to how any commission gets created in the first
place. The limited purpose of this article is to think about
how best to design the commissions that will eventually
be put in place, and the Ohio and California experiences
provide some support for focusing this article on com-
missions whose proposals become law only when vetted
via legislative vote or referendum. Elsewhere I have dis-
cussed the relevance of these arguments for the prior but
obviously related question—how to get electoral reform
commissions created in the first place. See Heather
Gerken, “Citizens Must Drive Electoral Reform,” Roll Call,
Nov. 15, 2005; see generally authorities cited infraˇnote 28.
Given the limited nature of this essay and the important
differences between the two contexts, I leave a fuller ex-
ploration of that question for another day.
23 For an exploration of the inevitable connection between
law and politics in a quite different context, the debate
over the International Criminal Court, see Richard H.
Pildes, Conflicts Between American and European View of the
Law: The Dark Side of Liberalism, 44 Va. Int’l L.J. 15, 156–61
(2003).
there is evidence—too limited at this point to
draw firm conclusions—that a pure indepen-
dence model may not be perfectly suited to pro-
duce reform proposals capable of withstanding
a run through the political mill.
Consider Rachel Barkow’s study of sentenc-
ing commissions.24 As with electoral reform,
those in favor of lower sentences face a diffi-
cult political battle, with powerful special in-
terest groups working against sentence reduc-
tion and weak political support in favor of
lower sentences. In her study of sentencing
commissions in the United States, Barkow com-
pares the success of independent and non-in-
dependent sentencing commissions and con-
cludes that “the more influential agencies are
not those with the greatest insulation from pol-
itics, but rather those commissions that are
closer to political actors and work within the
political culture.”25
Closer to the subject matter is Christopher El-
mendorf’s exhaustive analysis of advisory elec-
toral commissions.26 Based on a comparative
study of the United States, Canada, Australia,
and England, Elmendorf concludes that the op-
timal model for overcoming the problem of po-
litical entrenchment is not to create a politically
insulated constitutional court or regulatory
commission but to “augment rather than dis-
place ordinary lawmaking and political con-
testation” by creating a permanent commission
with a solely advisory role.27
Finally, consider the studies examining suc-
cessful voting reform efforts worldwide,28 par-
ticularly Dennis Pilon’s report for the Law
Commission of Canada and Fair Vote Canada29
and the studies of New Zealand’s switch from
a first-past-the-post system to a semi-propor-
tional system in 1993.30 Although these reports
do not focus on the institutional mechanisms
most likely to result in reform, they suggest
some more general conclusions we can draw
about the important role that political parties
and interest groups play in generating suffi-
cient support for reform to succeed.31
While these studies—and the underlying
empirical evidence on which they rely—take
quite different approaches in their methodol-
ogy and analysis,32 one can discern two com-
mon threads in the evidence that seem relevant
to the question before us: (1) the value of a po-
litical sounding board for reform commissions,
and (2) the crucial role elites play in building
political support for change. Both suggest that
power is associated with what I term political
inoculation—the introduction of some poli-
ticking into the decision making process itself.
While the literature is in too embryonic a stage
to draw any firm conclusions, the findings of
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24 Barkow, supra note 18.
25 Id. at 719. Barkow’s study synthesizes and is supported
by a number of other state-by-state analyses on the rela-
tive success of sentencing commissions. See infra text ac-
companying notes 35 (drawing on some of those sources).
26 Elmendorf, supra note 13.
27 Id. at 1371.
28 See, e.g., Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both
Worlds?, supra note 17, at 55–278: Symposium The Politics of
Electoral Reform, Japan v. Italy and New Zealand 16 Int. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 1 (1995); Takayuki Sakamoto, Explaining Electoral Re-
form: Japan v. Italy and New Zealand, 5 Party Pol. 419 (1999).
29 Dennis Pilon, Renewing Canadian Democracy: Citizen En-
gagement in Voting System Reform (March 2002).
30 See, e.g., Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie, New Zealand
Adopts Proportional Representation (1998); Denemark, 
supra note 17; Andrew Geddis and Caroline Morris, “All
is Changed, Changed Utterly?”—The Causes and Conse-
quences of New Zealand’s Adoption of MMP, 32 Fed. L. Rev.
451, 454–46 (2004); Nagel, supra note 18; Jack Vowles, The
Politics of Electoral Reform in New Zealand, 16 Int. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 95 (1995); Hon. Sir John Wallace, Reflections on Con-
stitutional and Other Issues Concerning our Electoral System:
The Past and the Future, 33 Victoria Univ. Wellington L.
Rev. 297 (2002); see also infra text accompanying note 62
(defining a mixed-member proportional system). Al-
though Italy, Japan, and New Zealand all switched vot-
ing systems in 1993 and 1994, I focus here on New
Zealand because, like the United States, it had a long his-
tory of using a first-past-the-post election system. Further,
New Zealand had an ad-hoc electoral reform commission
that operated in political conditions that seem closer to
everyday American politics than those that existed in
Italy, see Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts, Under-
standing the Dynamic of Electoral Reform, 16 Int. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 9, 11 (1995), and perhaps than those that existed in
Japan. See generally, Sakamoto, supra note 28.
31 See, e.g., Pilon, supra note 29, at 18, 19, 23, 27, 28, 39, 47;
Dunleavy and Margetts, supra note 30, at 12.
32 Only Barkow has self-consciously challenged the value
of political independence. Elmendorf, for instance, places
great emphasis on the value of independence, although
that emphasis may stem in part from the fact that his pro-
posal for advisory commissions already presumes that the
commission’s ability to get something done depends on
its ability to negotiate the political process. Pilon does not
directly address the issue of independence, but his paper
certainly has much praise for the role independent com-
missions have played in achieving reform. The same is
true of the scholarship on New Zealand’s shift to a semi-
proportional system.
these studies comport sufficiently with com-
mon sense and more well-established litera-
tures that they provide a useful basis for some
initial speculation.
The sounding board. The first reason that
political inoculation serves a useful purpose in
furthering reform stems from the role that leg-
islators and other political elites can play as a
sounding board. Reform commissions—
whether they are made up of citizens or tech-
nocrats—may have a tin ear about the political
viability of their proposals. They may not know
what types of proposals are likely to have po-
litical legs, let alone how best to frame the pro-
posals put forward. One remedy for that prob-
lem is to create a mechanism for introducing a
dose of political reality into the decision mak-
ing process.
Rachel Barkow, for instance, notes that sen-
tencing commissions that include some leg-
islative members succeed in part because those
members can “alert the commission to political
concerns.”33 One of the most successful sen-
tencing commissions in the United States has
been Minnesota’s, which was chaired by a
“skilled lobbyist” who “kept close contact with
the legislature to lobby on behalf of the Com-
mission and its work product.”34 Moreover, be-
cause the Minnesota commission was deter-
mined to understand the lay of the political
landscape, it did not merely issue a general no-
tice for public hearings and listen to whomever
turned up, but “proactively targeted interested
groups and individuals and used direct mail to
encourage their participation.”35 Thus, rather
than treating citizens as an undifferentiated
mass, the commission treated them as poten-
tial members of interests groups that might
play a role in whether reform would succeed.
The political work of the Minnesota com-
mission paid off, as the commission was able
to convince legislators to adopt a variety of re-
forms. Most interestingly, the commission
found a politically viable hook to convince leg-
islators to reduce sentences: resource con-
straints and the costs imposed by an overpop-
ulated prison system. Unlike several of its
independent counterparts, the Minnesota com-
mission then focused its energies on producing
prison population impact statements, which
turned out to have a discernible effect on leg-
islative conduct.36
Consider also the success of the U.K.’s Elec-
toral Commission, which uses pilot projects
and opinion research to test the political waters
before committing to a particular reform pro-
posal. For instance, the Commission conducted
extensive research about the views of the
British public on campaign finance. That re-
search disclosed a level of public confusion and
ambivalence about public financing that led the
Commission to adopt a more incremental ap-
proach to campaign finance reform that fit well
with most citizens’ sense of how public fi-
nancing should work.37
Finally, the Royal Commission on the Elec-
toral System, widely credited as one of the cat-
alysts for New Zealand’s 1993 decision to
switch election systems,38 also took politics into
account during its decision making process.
For example, the membership of the Royal
Commission was deliberately designed to be
politically insulated and thus did not include
any members of Parliament (MPs) or former
members of Parliament.39 But precisely
“[b]ecause the Commission included no MPs,
it made a particular effort to hear the views of
a range of current and past MPs, together with
groups of MPs selected by each of the three po-
litical parties represented in the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Maori MPs.”40
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33 Barkow, supra note 18, at 719. Another benefit to this
strategy is that legislators, in turn, get exposed to per-
spectives and viewpoints that do not otherwise dominate
the political discourse (assuming the commission is com-
posed of a sufficiently diverse membership). Id. at 801.
34 Id. at 773.
35 Id. For additional accounts of the success of the Min-
nesota commission, see Richard S. Frase, Implementing
Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the
First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y.
279 (1993); Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States Sen-
tencing Commission Miss?, 101 Yale L.J 1773 (1992); Susan
E. Martin, “The Politics of Sentencing Reform: Sentencing
Guidelines in Pennsylvania and Minnesota,” in The Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, Research on Sentencing: The
Search for Reform 265 (Blumstein et al., eds. 1983).
36 Barkow, supra note 18, at 776–77.
37 Elmendorf, supra note 13, at 1439–40.
38 See, e.g., Denemark, supra note 17, at 71.
39 Jackson and McRobie, supra note 30, at 104; Wallace,
supra note 30, at 298.
40 Jackson and McRobie, supra note 30, at 104.
Elites as advocates and agenda setters. The
need for allies provides a second reason why
political inoculation ought to be appealing to
someone concerned with ensuring that demo-
cratic support for reform is broad and deep.
Once a commission decides on a reform pro-
posal, the next step is to get it implemented.
And what has taken place during the decision
making process will often affect what allies the
commission will have during the implementa-
tion stage. Here again, those decision making
bodies that are able to appeal to at least some
legislators, party officials, or special interest
groups encounter greater success in generating
political energy behind reform.41
Barkow, for instance, notes that legislative
members of sentencing commissions are not
merely good sounding boards, but “provide
ready-made advocates for the commission’s
conclusions when the legislature as a whole de-
bates its proposals.”42 Similarly, Elmendorf de-
scribes the admittedly self-interested—but
highly successful—efforts of the House of
Lords, the Liberal Democrats, and the Conser-
vative Party to publicize and advocate the re-
form proposals made by the U.K.’s Electoral
Commission.43 And those who have studied re-
form efforts in New Zealand often emphasize
the importance of such things as “independent-
minded” politicians, and the self-interested ef-
forts of the minority party to use electoral re-
form as a weapon against the majority party.44
No one should be surprised that the support
of political elites matters in this context. Elites
not only have access to the media and other av-
enues for communicating with citizens, but
they may also be skilled at framing issues and
raising awareness. Indeed, a well-established
literature documents the ways that interest
groups and party leaders can shape public
opinion by offering cues to voters and framing
an issue effectively.45 Consistent with this long-
standing literature, the empirical work on in-
dependence suggests that the reform commis-
sions that have proved most successful in
persuading the public to back a reform pro-
posal have been able to harness the skills of
those elites in the service of reform.
Indeed, one of the lessons we can draw from
the reform experiences of other countries is that
reform proposals often gain the most traction
when they become a stick used by the opposi-
tion party to beat up the party in power.46 It is
not the most high-minded use to which reform
proposals can be put, but it is effective.47 Con-
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41 Disillusionment with politics or political parties can, of
course, undermine the effectiveness of this strategy. In
New Zealand, for instance, hostility toward politicians
and the political system ran so high that one former prime
minister “quipped that the only way the major parties
could stop [reform] was to endorse it.” Nagel, supra note
18, at 526.
42 Barkow, supra note 18, at 719, 802–03.
43 Elmendorf, supra note 13, at 1396–1404.
44 Pilon, supra note 29, at 22–23; see also Denemark, supra
note 17, at 89, 91–93; Vowles, supra note 30, at 104–05.
45 See, e.g., Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, The
Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to
Know (1998); William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Pop-
ulism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and
the Theory of Social Choice (1982); Paul M. Sniderman et al.,
Reasoning and Choices: Explorations in Political Psychology
(1991); John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opin-
ion (1992); Julie L. Andsager, How Interest Groups Attempt
to Shape Public Opinion with Competing New Frames, 77
Journalism & Mass Comm. Q. 577 (2000); Elizabeth R.
Gerber and Justin H. Phillips, Development Ballot Measures,
Interest Group Endorsements, and the Political Geography of
Growth Preferences, 47 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 625 (2003); Jeffrey
A. Karp, “The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initia-
tive Campaigns,” in Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democ-
racy in the United States 109 (Bowler et al., eds. 1998); James
H. Kuklinski and Norman L. Hurley, “It’s a matter of in-
terpretation,” in Political Persuasion and Attitude Change
(Mutz et al., eds. 1996); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus En-
cyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California In-
surance Reform Elections, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 63 (1994);
Michael A. Lewkowicz, The Effectiveness of Elite Cues as
Heuristics in Proposition Elections, 34 Am. Pol. Res. 51 (Jan.
2006); Jeffrey J. Mondak, Source Cues and Policy Approval:
The Cognitive Dynamics of Support for the Reagan Agenda,
37 Am. Pol. Sci. 186 (1993); Richard G. Niemi and Anders
Westholm, Issues, Parties and Attitudinal Stability: A Com-
parative Study of Sweden and the United States, 3 Electoral
Stud. 65 (1984); Thomas E. Nelson and Donald R. Kinder,
Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opin-
ions, 58 J. Pol. 1055 (1996); Thomas E. Nelson, Policy Goals,
Public Rhetoric, and Political Attitudes, 66 J. Pol. 581 (2004);
Lee Sigelman, Voting in Gubernatorial Succession Referenda:
The Incumbency Cue, 51 J. Pol. 869 (1989). But see James N.
Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson, Framing and Delibera-
tion: How Citizens’ Conversations Limit Elite Influence, 47
Am J. Pol. Sci. 729 (2003) (suggesting that discussions
among citizens of diverse viewpoints can reduce the ef-
fect of framing on individual attitudes).
46 See, e.g., Vowles, supra note 30, at 103 (describing the
National opposition’s use of New Zealand’s Royal Com-
mission’s reform recommendations to attack Labour, the
party in power); id. at 105 (describing minor parties’ sup-
port for reform); Elmendorf, supra note 13, at 1396–1404
(describing use of Royal Commission reports to score
points off of the Labour Party by its political enemies). It
is even more useful in this regard when the parties switch
sider, for instance, the role that opposition par-
ties in Great Britain and New Zealand have
played in publicizing the proposals of its advi-
sory electoral commission and shaming the ma-
jority party into supporting electoral reform.48
In sum, a little bit of politics seems to go a
long way in facilitating the success of reform
efforts generated by electoral reform com-
missions. At some point, most commissions
seeking reform at the intersection of law 
and politics must wade into the political
swamp. What the limited empirical literature
on this topic suggests is that it is useful for
these decisionmakers to have been inoculated
against some of the more serious diseases cir-
culating around that terrain before plunging
ahead.
Public education as an alternative to inocu-
lation? One might think that a privately funded
or state-funded public education campaign, not
political inoculation, is the solution for push-
ing reform through the political process. After
all, if the problem is that the public requires in-
formation and cues about reform proposals,
why not give the electoral reform commission
the chance to oversee an education campaign
in order to bypass self-interested elites, allow-
ing the educational campaign to obviate the
need for the sorts of cues that political parties
usually generate? One such example is the pub-
lic education campaign funded by the New
Zealand government prior to the country’s de-
cision to switch voting systems. A well-funded
and intelligently run public education cam-
paign might do much to help the cause of re-
form.
Here again, however, politics rears its ugly
head. The main problem with this argument is
that the practical difficulty remains—a legisla-
ture that opposes reform is hardly likely to of-
fer an adequate educational campaign in re-
form’s favor. New Zealand’s public education
campaign was quite rare in scope and design.49
And even that campaign was thought by some
to be underfunded50 and so tightly circum-
scribed by legislative mandates (the campaign
was required to be “objective[]” and present
only the “facts”) that it had little effect on the
public.51
More importantly, even if a campaign is
funded privately, a public education campaign
cannot transform a politically unpopular pro-
posal into a popular one. Indeed, one would
guess that political inoculation would be as im-
portant for a successful public education pro-
gram as any other part of the reform process,
as the efficacy of an educational campaign
would depend on framing, understanding the
preferences of voters, and having a viable po-
litical idea to promote.52 An educational cam-
paign is a powerful tool in politics, but it is only
one of them and seems an inadequate shield
against the double-edged sword of indepen-
dence.
II. INOCULATING WITHOUT
INFECTING: STRIKING THE 
BALANCE BETWEEN INDEPENDENCE
AND POLITICS
Even if one is convinced that political inocu-
lation is a useful strategy for electoral reform
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places—that is, when the opposition party has called for
reform while in the minority and then suddenly finds it-
self in power, with the ability to keep its promises.
47 We see this dynamic in other contexts. Consider, for in-
stance, the role the 9/11 commission played in the 2004
presidential election. We often saw politicians compete in
showing their support for the popular commission, and
Senator Kerry, the losing presidential candidate, was cer-
tainly able to rely on the commission in challenging Pres-
ident Bush.
48 Supra text accompanying notes 43, 44, and 46.
49 Jackson and McRobie, supra note 30, at 234 (“As far as
we are aware, no other government has ever provided
funding for a mass public information and education
campaign while, at the same time, surrendering total re-
sponsibility for its content to an independent, non-parti-
san body”). Further, a great deal of politicking was nec-
essary before the major parties were willing to create an
adequate educational program, and political elites played
a key role in pushing reform. Pilon, supra note 29, at 47.
50 Jackson and McRobie, supra note 30, at 262.
51 Vowles, supra note 30, at 109; but see Nagel, supra note
18, at 526–27 (arguing that the public education campaign
“helped to produce a remarkably high level of public un-
derstanding about electoral mechanics”); Pilon, supra note
29, at 47 (offering a positive assessment of the campaign).
52 See, e.g., Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan, Do Voters
Have a Cue?: Television Advertisements As a Source of Infor-
mation in Citizen-Initiated Referendum Campaigns, 41 Eur. J.
Pol. Res. 777 (2002) (finding that government education
programs work especially well when they provide cues to
voters, including information about elite endorsements).
commissions, a more difficult question remains:
how to inoculate such commissions against pol-
itics while avoiding the risk of a serious infec-
tion. After all, one could as easily write an es-
say entitled “the double-edged sword of
politics” and point out that electoral reform
commissions completely infected by politics are
unlikely to achieve reform or inspire democra-
tic energy within the polity. A commission’s
give-and-take with politicians might unduly
water down any reform that is passed. A com-
mission might pay so much attention to politics
that it loses the patina of independence that gave
it standing to speak in the first place. There is
obviously a balance to be struck here, a task that
will depend on context and a set of empirical
and normative questions that are not fully
fleshed out in this article. The purpose of this ar-
ticle is merely to suggest that the balance may
have tipped too heavily in favor of indepen-
dence; a full-blown analysis of what an appro-
priate inoculation strategy might look like for
both types of institutions is beyond its scope.
Nonetheless, let me offer a few comparative ob-
servations about technocratic and citizen-based
reform commissions in Section II.A before turn-
ing to the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly
as a case study for working through some of
these problems in Section II.B.
A. Choosing a robust site for inoculation:
Technocrats v. citizens
In thinking about how to strike the proper
balance between political infection and politi-
cal quarantine, it is clear that one’s inoculation
strategy must be tailored to the type of institu-
tion in question. If one is concerned about
whether reform proposals will get passed, ex-
pert commissions and citizens’ assemblies en-
ter the political fray with different strengths
and weaknesses, and those strengths and
weaknesses should affect our assessment of
whether inoculation is necessary and how great
are the risks of infection. Because the advan-
tages associated with technocratic commissions
seem obvious (presumably the reason why aca-
demics and reformers so often recommend
them), I will dwell a bit more on the underap-
preciated justifications for thinking that citi-
zens’ assemblies represent a fairly hearty insti-
tutional specimen for political inoculation.
1. Heuristics and institutional vulnerabili-
ties: Expertise v. the voice of the people. One
common strength shared by expert commis-
sions and citizens’ assemblies as they negotiate
the terrain of everyday politics is that each of-
fers a useful heuristic for reformers to deploy
in political debate. One of the problems in get-
ting reform passed is that the party in power
will almost always oppose reform, and voters
are likely to take their cues about reform pro-
posals from party leaders. Further, opponents
of reform have two ready-made strategies for
framing their opposition: (1) those supporting
reform are “sore losers” and motivated by par-
tisanship (that is, reformers are too infected by
politics to be trusted), and (2) reformers are elit-
ist, antidemocratic, or naive (that is, reformers
are too quarantined from politics to be trusted).
EXPERT COMMISSIONS. The technocratic com-
mission, of course, offers a particularly useful
cue for avoiding the first kind of accusation—
that a reform proposal is motivated by a parti-
san purpose. In common parlance, expertise
implies neutrality. Further, people tend to de-
fer to experts in sorting through complicated
issues like electoral reform. That expertise
gives technocratic commissions an important
card to play in the game of politics, perhaps
overcoming inertia or resistance that might oth-
erwise exist regarding a particular policy pro-
posal.
The danger for expert commissions is that
they remain quite vulnerable to the second type
of attack—the claim that they are antidemoc-
ratic or out of touch. And it is not hard to imag-
ine the reality matching up with the stereotype.
To be sure, expert commission members will
presumably enjoy the advantages of being re-
peat players in the political process (especially
if the commission members themselves serve
multi-year terms). One might even hope that
experts on elections, in particular, would be
more savvy about politics than their counter-
parts elsewhere. Nonetheless, expertise can be
a handicap in negotiating the political process.
There remains a significant distance between
studying and playing the game of politics, and
the incentive structures within the academy
may render some experts out of touch with
day-to-day realities. Further, technocrats may
know too much about arcane election issues to
generate politically viable reform proposals;
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being deeply steeped in a professional culture
can give one a tin ear to politics and prevent
decision makers from being sufficiently flexi-
ble in their approach.
Under such circumstances, an inoculation
strategy should prove useful to technocratic
commissions. Experts need information about
how nonexperts think and vote to assess what
kinds of reform proposals might fly. By intro-
ducing a little bit of everyday politics into the
discussion, a commission can temper its tech-
nocratic impulses with a bit of political realism.
CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLIES. Citizens’ assemblies en-
joy a different set of advantages and handicaps
in entering the political fray than expert com-
missions possess. A citizens’ assembly has the
potential to provide a powerful cue to voters,
one likely to be useful in overcoming both of
the conventional challenges to electoral reform.
That is because it is difficult to accuse a ran-
domly selected assembly of being either parti-
san sore losers or anti-democratic. To the con-
trary, one would expect the blessing of a
citizens’ assembly to function like the democ-
ratic version of the Good Housekeeping Seal of
Approval. After all, it seems to represent some-
thing extraordinarily elusive in politics—the
genuine voice of the people. Politicians are
likely to be fairly reluctant to accuse everyday
citizens of political taint or question an assem-
bly’s democratic credentials.
Nonetheless, citizens remain vulnerable to at
least one type of challenge from those opposed
to reform: inexperience.53 And, as with expert
commissions, one can imagine the justifications
for such an accusation. After all, most citizens
lack expertise in election reform and have had
little experience with the political process, both
of which could undermine the chances that
they will succeed in the political fray. We also
might expect citizens to be less politically sure-
footed than their technocratic counterparts.
Here, again, political inoculation could prove
to be a useful strategy. Consultation with old
political hands could help citizens avoid be-
ginner’s mistakes. A bit of cold political real-
ism might temper overly enthusiastic or ideal-
istic decision makers, or at least help channel
their enthusiasm in politically sensible direc-
tions.
INOCULATION STRATEGIES. What would inocu-
lation look like in practice? As an informal mat-
ter, reform commissions could seek out inter-
action with legislators and seasoned reformers,
or engage in polling and small-scale experi-
mentation to discern the political viability of
particular proposals. There are also numerous
formal institutional tweaks that might help in-
oculate a reform commission. For instance, a
reform commission’s membership might in-
clude legislators or party leaders. Or the com-
mission might float trial balloons—pilot proj-
ects or tentative proposals to gauge the level of
support for a particular idea.
Which inoculation strategy makes the most
sense will depend on the institution. For in-
stance, given that citizens’ assemblies (at least
those we’ve seen thus far) tend to be quite
large, the addition of a single legislative mem-
ber may be less useful than it would be on ex-
pert commissions, which are usually smaller.
Similarly, polling and focus groups might be
more important for expert commissions if we
think of the citizens’ assembly as something
akin to a built-in focus group.
2. Inoculating without infecting. One might
object, however, that such concessions to
everyday politics risk eliminating precisely
what makes such each type of electoral com-
mission special: neutral expertise (in the case
of technocratic commissions) and authenticity
(in the case of citizens’ assemblies). The risk is
a genuine one. There are nonetheless good rea-
sons to think that both types of institutions are
well-suited to ward off the infection of politics
in the long term.
As to expert commissions, the fact that its
members are part of what we might call a pro-
fessional guild may make them less vulnerable
to the dangers of infection (and thus able to
withstand a healthy dose of politics in the de-
cision making process). Technocrats answer to
a set of professional norms generated outside
of the political process, so they should be less
likely to succumb to political pressures than
those without such an anchor.
Though citizens’ assemblies lack such a con-
straint, they, too, seem fairly able to withstand
a dose of everyday politics. After all, the odds
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53 For an example of such an attack on the only citizens’
assembly to have taken place thus far, see infra note 70.
are fairly steep that a randomly drawn group
of citizens will be any more receptive to the ap-
peals of self-interested legislators than the rest
of the polity. It is with good reason that polit-
ical theorists have long valued randomness as
a strategy for distributing political power.54 It
is neutral, thus depriving the state (or, here,
legislators) of the power to appoint, one of the
most common strategies for influencing agency
decisions ex ante. That seems especially true
when one considers that the coins of the realm
in a citizens’ assembly are not money or power,
but time and a willingness to participate.55
Further, if we imagine a permanent citizens’
assembly or one that convenes every five or ten
years,56 it is not only randomness that will help
ward off political infection, but episodic turn-
over (given that citizens are volunteering their
time to serve, multi-year terms seem impracti-
cal). Regular turnover eliminates the worry that
assembly members will get too cozy with po-
litical interests, as the sort of repeat interactions
and long-term ties that facilitate capture would
be quite difficult under such circumstances.57
The combination of a random draw and
episodic service also offers a built-in mecha-
nism for reflection and fine-tuning for the citi-
zens’ assembly. Each new assembly has an op-
portunity to take a different tack than the
assembly before. Episodic service all but forces
the new assembly to reflect on the record of its
predecessor, and it reduces the risk associated
with one set of decision makers becoming over-
committed to its own, unsuccessful strategy (be
it the route of quarantine or infection).
Finally, in the long run, both expert commis-
sions and citizens’ assemblies have significant in-
centives to strike the right balance between in-
fection and quarantine.58 If such institutions live
up to their promise—if they truly offer an ex-
pert’s view or genuinely reflect the people’s
will—they will not be the lone voice of reform.
As the New Zealand reform experience suggests,
the decisions of a commission can often provide
a rallying point for reform-minded organizations
to generate political energy.59 Further, political
entrepreneurs of all stripes would recognize the
power associated with the imprimatur of a well-
respected reform commission. They are likely to
vie for its “blessing” and throw their support be-
hind as many of its proposals as they could.60
The ability of both types of commissions to
leverage this kind of power, however, depends
on perception—the perception of either neutral
expertise or authenticity. Too little politicking,
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54 See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, Random Justice: On Lotteries and
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55 Here again, there is a potential downside to this design
feature. Pure randomness is not possible in this context,
as the time commitment involved requires some measure
of self-selection by participants. It is quite possible that
the people willing to serve on a citizens’ assembly are not
representative of the people generally. For instance, an as-
sembly might attract more reform-minded zealots than a
truly random draw. And randomness itself, of course, can
generate decision making bodies dominated by those
with outlier political views. See Heather K. Gerken, Sec-
ond-Order Diversity, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1099 (2005).
56 There are, of course, costs and benefits associated with
permanence. On the one hand, a permanent assembly
tasked with handling a variety of electoral-reform issues
would have ample opportunity to build its reputational
capital. On the other hand, constant revision of electoral
rules could lead to unnecessary instability and uncer-
tainty in the political process, focusing the attention of po-
litical parties on fights over the rules of competition rather
than substantive politics. Further, constant battles over
electoral reform might inure citizens to these debates, thus
reducing the level of political support for change.
57 Episodic service may also be a source of weakness for
the assembly model, however, as it means that partici-
pants will not have a chance to build on experience and
hone their political skills. Thus, some sort of inoculation
may be essential for a citizens’ assembly precisely to pro-
vide a needed corrective against political naïveté.
58 Elemendorf makes a similar point in his work on ad-
visory commissions. See Elmendorf, supra note 13, at
1382–84, 1431–36.
59 Denemark, supra note 17, at 88; Geddis, supra note 30,
at 458; Jackson and McRobie, supra note 30, at 123–24;
Nagel, supra note 18, at 526; Pilon, supra note 29, at 46–47.
60 Consider the impressive competition among U.S. politi-
cians for the blessings of the 9/11 Commission or the Jer-
sey Girls, who played such a prominent role in articulat-
ing the needs and desires of the families of 9/11 victims
in the wake of the attack. Elmendorf, supra note 13, at
1384.
and each will be vulnerable to challenges that
it is too isolated or too unrepresentative to war-
rant deference from voters. Too much politick-
ing, and neither has something distinctive to
offer to the debate. Put differently, commis-
sions like these have a built-in sunset provision.
The moment they lose the support of the citi-
zenry—either because they failed to politic or
they politicked too much—they lose their abil-
ity to affect the political debate.
At least for citizens’ assemblies,61 there is
more to the argument than the claim that it has
the right incentives to strike an appropriate
balance between political quarantine and po-
litical infection. Even if a citizens’ assembly
fails, we may see a different organization—one
that does a better job of striking that balance—
rising to take its place. The tenor of the con-
versation, at least, will continue to change.
Here’s why. Even if a citizens’ assembly were
to fail, the way that it would fail seems likely
to generate new opportunities for grassroots in-
fluence on the political process. The mere exis-
tence of the institution changes the political ter-
rain. That is because there are a limited number
of strategies available for attacking an institu-
tion like a citizens’ assembly. The debate seems
almost destined to focus primarily on who gen-
uinely speaks for the people. An effective at-
tack would require one to point to a different
institution that has standing to speak for the
people. Thus, even if the assembly were to
wade too deeply into the political swamp, other
organizations would be able to contest the as-
sembly’s claim to authority.
B. The British Columbia experience: A case study
The generalities offered above, of course, are
just that—generalities. Any prescription for in-
oculating an electoral reform commission re-
quires a number of contextual judgments. To
ground this analysis a bit, let me close by of-
fering a case study of one such decision mak-
ing body—the British Columbia Citizen’s As-
sembly—and the ways in which inoculation
might have been a useful strategy for helping
the Assembly’s reform proposal become a 
reality.
As noted above, the B.C. Citizens’ Assembly
was charged with considering whether the
province’s first-past-the-post system ought to
be abandoned. The Assembly was drawn from
a pool that was randomly selected from lists
stratified by age, gender, and district. After the
pool was winnowed down to those willing and
eligible to take part, 158 members were drawn
(one woman and one man from each district),
with two members from the First Nations peo-
ples then added to round out the group. The
eleven-month, multi-stage deliberation process
included a “learning phase” (consisting of pre-
sentations and small discussion groups), the
“public hearing phrase” (50 public hearings,
each attended by subsets of the assembly’s
membership, and an opportunity for written
comments), and the “deliberation phase” (dur-
ing which the Assembly came up with its rec-
ommendation). During the deliberation phrase,
the Assembly narrowed down the choice of po-
tential alternatives to a single-transferable vote
(STV) system (which allows voters to rank can-
didates and uses those rankings to distribute
votes among the candidates) and a mixed
member proportional (MMP) system (which
elects candidates using both single-member
districts and proportional voting). The Assem-
bly than endorsed STV over B.C.’s current sys-
tem—a first-past-the-post, single-member dis-
tricting system—by a substantial margin.62
The B.C. Assembly’s proposal that the
province switch to STV was then put on a
provincial referendum, to be implemented if it
garnered a “double majority”: (1) more than
60% of the ballots cast province-wide, and (2)
a simple majority in 60% of the province’s rid-
ings. The Assembly’s proposal succeeded in
gaining a majority in all but two of the
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61 It is more difficult to discern whether the creation of an
expert commission has the same power to change politi-
cal discourse. First, expert commissions are more com-
mon than citizens’ assemblies and thus less likely to make
a political splash. Second, the obvious grounds for chal-
lenging expert commissions—that they are antidemocra-
tic or too insulated from everyday citizens—seem less
likely to push toward a search for a “more” expert re-
placement.
62 The description in this paragraph was drawn from the
official final report circulated by the organizers of the As-
sembly, Final Report, Making Every Vote Count: The Case for
Electoral Reform in British Columbia (2005), available 
at http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/final.
report.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
province’s ridings but fell just short (about
58%) of the supermajority vote requirement.63
The government has scheduled another refer-
endum on the proposal for 2008 in the hope
that public discussion will result in a more con-
clusive result.64
1. Heuristics and institutional vulnerabili-
ties. As an initial matter, the Assembly pro-
vides some reason to think that citizens’ as-
semblies offer a particularly intriguing model
for reformers trying to navigate difficult polit-
ical terrain. To begin, the British Columbia ex-
perience offers suggestive, albeit very limited,
evidence of the potential power associated with
citizen assemblies as vehicles for reform. One
might think that is an odd conclusion given
that the Assembly’s proposal failed to pass. But
even though its proposal did not garner the
necessary 60% of the popular vote to pass, two
facts stand out.
First, one cannot help but be impressed by
the large number of citizens who voted for re-
form despite the absence of an adequate pub-
lic education campaign or significant public 
debate. Part of the B.C. Assembly’s success ob-
viously stems from its agenda-setting power.
Because the Assembly could place a proposal
on the ballot, it was able to begin a conversa-
tion about reform in British Columbia that had
not taken place before then.
But the power of the B.C. Citizens’ Assembly,
I suspect, went beyond the power that might
have been wielded by a comparably situated in-
dependent commission of technocrats. After all,
the Assembly had no money for a public educa-
tion campaign, and political elites maintained a
virtual radio silence about the issue; the combi-
nation might well represent the death knell for
any initiative proposal. It therefore seems quite
remarkable that approximately 58% of the B.C.
citizenry—having received little or no informa-
tion about the referendum65—were apparently
willing to gamble on the reform proposal simply
because the Citizens’ Assembly had proposed it.
Perhaps one can attribute the vote entirely to po-
litical cynicism—many B.C. voters preferred
anything to the status quo.66 But it is hard to ig-
nore the possibility that the appearance of the
words “Citizens’ Assembly” on the ballot had an
effect on voters’ decisions.
Second, the nominally failed effort of the B.C.
Assembly continues to have a remarkable ef-
fect on B.C. politics. The fact that the referen-
dum garnered a significant majority of votes
made it all but impossible for incumbent politi-
cians to ignore the proposal. As a result, the
Lieutenant-Governor recently announced that
the government would take up the issue again
and run a second referendum on the proposal.
Interestingly, in making this announcement,
the governing party was extremely cautious
about creating the appearance that it was dis-
placing the Assembly’s proposal with a differ-
ent reform idea. As the Lieutenant-Governor
herself emphasized, the governing party “does
not accept that the 79 members of [B.C.’s] as-
sembly are any better qualified than the . . .
members of the Citizens’ Assembly” to “choose
the best electoral model.”67 Instead, the Lieu-
tenant-Governor highlighted the government’s
respect for the Assembly’s “citizen-centered”
model and attributed the failure of the refer-
endum to the Assembly’s inability to provide
specific information as to how boundaries un-
der [the Assembly’s proposed] system would
be drawn.68 Indeed, even as the Lieutenant-
Governor announced important changes to the
Assembly’s proposal, she insisted that her
party was merely hewing to the Assembly’s
plan—just “taking it to its ultimate conclu-
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63 Tom Fletcher, “Electoral Reformers Pressing Ahead,”
Williams Lake Trib. (July 19, 2005).
64 Iona Campagnolo, Speech from the Throne, Opening of
the First Session, Thirty-Eighth Parliament, British Co-
lumbia (Sept. 12, 2005).
65 Wendy Stueck, “STV gets high-profile boost,” The Globe
and Mail, May 9, 2005, at S1 (noting that April poll “found
that nearly half of the voters in British Columbia know
‘nothing at all’ about STV”).
66 See Jeffrey Simpson, “A vote for something—or just
anything at all?” The Globe and Mail, May 21, 2005, at A19
(offering this explanation); see also Ratner, supra note 11,
at 24 (prior to the vote, noting widespread “public dis-
enchantment with parliamentary politics”). That seems to
have been the case in New Zealand, for instance, where
85% of New Zealand’s voters cast a ballot against the ex-
isting first-past-the-post election system due to “over-
whelming disillusionment with politicians and the polit-
ical system,” Nagel, supra note 18, at 526, although there,
too, an electoral reform commission had endorsed an al-
ternative system.
67 Campagnolo, supra note 64, at 26.
68 Id. at 26–27.
sion.”69 The governing party also gave in to the
demands of the Assembly’s alumni by promis-
ing adequate funding for an education cam-
paign.
The fact that the Assembly’s failed attempt to
pass its proposal through a referendum in-
duced this level of political pussyfooting by the
party in power is quite suggestive. It confirms
how difficult it is for partisan elites to compete
with a citizens’ assembly on authenticity
grounds and thus how hard it is for them to ig-
nore or challenge its proposals.70 Whether the
now-disbanded B.C. Assembly can keep the
pressure on politicians—and what effect elite
endorsements and challenges will have on the
next part of the story—remains to be seen.
2. Inoculating without infecting. The obvi-
ous question, of course, is whether there was
anything that might have improved the
chances that the Assembly’s proposal would
have passed in the first place. The Assembly’s
proposal won a surprising number of votes
given the constraints that existed, but would it
have been possible to do better? Although it is
impossible to offer a precise diagnosis, there
are reasons to think that, consistent with the in-
oculation hypothesis, the Assembly’s failure
came from engaging in too little politicking, not
too much.
There appears to be no evidence that the As-
sembly’s STV proposal failed to pass the 60%
threshold because the Assembly engaged in too
much politicking. Press reports contain no ac-
cusations that assembly members were im-
properly influenced by political considerations.
To the contrary, one of the rare attacks on the
assembly suggested that it was not sufficiently
in touch with the needs of the people, arguing
that the Assembly’s members were being led
by the nose by a bunch of out-of-touch, overly
idealistic academics.71
Moreover, the way the assembly was run
suggests that its problem was more likely to
stem from quarantine than infection. Legisla-
tors and the political parties remained quite
distant from the decision making process. With
the exception of the Greens, the parties seem to
have done relatively little lobbying during the
process (and the Greens’ strategy proved to be
quite unwelcome to the Assembly’s partici-
pants72). Moreover, neither legislators nor
party leaders helped in vetting the proposals
circulating around the Assembly.
Consider a few ways in which an inoculation
strategy might have aided passage of the B.C.
Assembly’s proposal. First, the Assembly
might have paid greater attention to the polit-
ical viability of its proposed change. According
to the Assembly’s final report, although STV
emerged as the clear choice among those de-
liberating, other ideas were available to As-
sembly members, including MMP.73 What
would have happened if Assembly members
had vetted their top two or three preferred al-
ternatives at an early stage in their delibera-
tions, either by talking to seasoned politicians
or reformers or by using polls to ascertain how
the average citizen (who, unlike Assembly
members, had not spent almost a year thinking
about electoral reform) reacted to each alterna-
tive? Perhaps it would have had no effect on
the decision of the Assembly. Or perhaps its
members would have chosen a different pro-
posal, one that would have been easier to ex-
plain or promote to the public.
For example, one of the evident handicaps
faced by STV proponents was the fact that the
system was used by only a few, small nations
across the globe. Had the participants focused
more on the next step in the reform process—
the need to convince a supermajority of the
electorate to vote for change—they might have
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70 As one reporter observed during the debate over the
referendum, “most of those who joined the debate over
BC-STV were careful to pay their respects to the citizens,
even as they disagreed with their recommendations.”
Vaughn Palmer, The Vancouver Sun, May 20, 2005, at A3.
71 See, e.g., Norman Spector, Lies and truth on the campaign
trail, Times Colonist (Victoria), April 29, 2005, at A14 (ar-
guing that an “unrepresentative group of British
Columbians” are using hard working B.C. natives as the
“mice in an experiment designed by well-meaning peo-
ple who spent too much time with tenured university pro-
fessors”).
72 Supra note 11.
73 Final Report, supra note 62, at 13 (showing that the
MMP proposal was initially favored by about 1/5th of
Assembly members); Les Levne, Comment, Politicians
should keep their hands off, Times Colonist, May 21, 2005,
at A10 (noting that a “mixed-member system”—appar-
ently favored at least by the Greens—”was never far from
the [assembly members’] minds”).
chosen to endorse MMP, a widely used system
adopted by a number of major Western democ-
racies and used by roughly half a billion peo-
ple.74 Its political saleability is evidenced by the
fact that it was chosen by three of the countries
to have changed their election systems most re-
cently (Italy, New Zealand, and Japan), and it
is often described by academics as a “middle
ground”75 or “best-of-both-worlds approach.”76
By way of contrast, consider the fact that New
Zealand’s successful electoral reform commis-
sion endorsed MMP over STV in part because
of the likelihood that MMP would “secur[e]
popular support.”77
Similarly, we might speculate as to whether
the Assembly might have benefited from more
high profile support during the referendum
process.78 As noted above, there is extensive
empirical evidence that voters use cues—like
endorsements from prominent party leaders
and officials—in evaluating an issue.79 But B.C.
voters were not given many cues by political
elites—at least by political elites who favored
reform. That is not surprising given that the As-
sembly ultimately chose a proposal that was
disfavored by the governing party and its pri-
mary opposition.80 Given how difficult it is for
political parties to attack citizens’ assemblies,81
British Columbia’s major parties seemed to
have used the second-most effective weapon at
their disposal—strategic silence—and thus de-
prived voters of much-needed information.
Indeed, the B.C. Assembly’s proposal was so
unpopular among B.C.’s political elites that
even the Greens—the one party that ought to
have been most enthusiastic about electoral re-
form—preferred a different plan.82 As a result,
the Greens were the sole party to endorse the
Assembly’s proposal, and they did so only af-
ter their leader had spoken strongly in favor of
a different plan.83 Individual political elites and
interest groups also kept their distance; even
Gordon Campbell, the Assembly’s primary ar-
chitect, failed to endorse its proposal.84 And it
appears that the only special interest group to
offer an endorsement, the Vancouver Board of
Trade, came out against the proposal.
Here again, an examination of the path not
taken might be useful. As noted above, reform
proposals are often most successful when they
can be used by the minority party to attack the
party in power.85 We know, of course, that the
Greens in B.C. were supportive of a move to-
ward greater proportionality (and, as a minor-
ity party, had every reason to desire it). By
choosing a proposal that most Greens, includ-
ing the party’s leader, disfavored, the Assembly
may have deprived itself of an important ally.
Perhaps as a result, according to one observer,
“no one of political significance is championing
a radical change begging for an evangelist.”86
It is, of course, impossible to prove that po-
litical inoculation—the path not taken by the
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77 Denemark, supra note 17, at 88.
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passage. See Denemark, supra note 17, at 89, 91–93;
Vowles, supra note 30, at 104–05.
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ness, “If STV fails, it will be years before we get change,”
The Vancouver Sun, May 12, 2005, at A15 (noting that the
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posal); Jeffrey Simpson, “A vote for something—or just
anything at all?” The Globe and Mail, May 21, 2005, at A19
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84 Palmer, supra note 80 (noting Campbell’s neutrality and
observing that even one week before the referendum that
the Dean of the University of Vancouver Law School was
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New Dem-ocrats who have come out in favour of STV”).
85 Supra text accompanying notes 43, 44, and 46.
86 James Travers, “B.C.’s proposed electoral system just
won’t work,” The Record, April 28, 2005, at A9.
B.C. Assembly—would have led to a success-
ful referendum vote in 2005. Striking the right
balance between political quarantine and po-
litical infection is a difficult task. Nonetheless,
it is worth at least considering whether politi-
cal inoculation might prove to be a useful strat-
egy for those proposing and designing such as-
semblies in the future.
CONCLUSION
Independence is a popular idea among acad-
emics and policymakers interested in electoral
reform. Rather than offering the conventional re-
sponse to calls for independence—the assertion
that independence cannot be had—this article
considers instead whether one can have too
much of a good thing. Its modest claim is that
we need not choose between political quarantine
and political infection. There exists a middle
ground in the design of electoral reform com-
missions: political inoculation. Introducing a lit-
tle bit of politics into a reform commission’s de-
cision making process may inoculate its
proposals against the political fray. The evidence
at this point is too limited to draw any firm con-
clusions. But given that conventional wisdom
pushes so forcefully in the direction of the pure
independence model, it is worth considering
whether inoculation might help electoral reform
commissions live up to their name.
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